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FOREWORD
In 1995 Finland joined the European Union (EU). This action
culminated several years of a fundamental reorientation of
Finnish security policy as Finland moved from the neutrality
imposed on it by the Soviet Union to a policy with a priority on
European integration through the European Union. Finland, in
joining the EU, has retained its independent defense and security
posture, even as it seeks to strengthen its standing abroad and
gain added leverage, through the EU, for dealing with Russia.
Finland's odyssey indicates much about two fundamental issues in
European security: coping with Russia's crises, and the
interrelationship between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization as providers of security for small states in Europe.
Furthermore, Finland's proximity to Russia and the difficult
history of Fenno-Russian relations have imposed on Finnish
policymakers the need for penetrating and sober analysis of
Finland's and Europe's security situation. Therefore, Finland's
evolution from an imposed neutrality to overt participation in
European integration merits our careful scrutiny and attention.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
When Finland joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, it
completed a fundamental transformation of its security policy.
Until the end of the Cold War, Finland's position in Europe
derived from its treaty with the Soviet Union which imposed
neutrality upon it and debarred Finland from any security
cooperation with Scandinavia, Western Europe, and the United
States. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union
allowed Finland to move towards European integration through the
EU while preserving its own independent defense posture. Other
reasons for moving towards the EU stemmed from Finland's new
economic vulnerability to trends in the European economy, and its
determination that current security challenges no longer included
the Cold War threat of military invasion. Rather, current dangers
involved the risk of a collapse of Russia's social or political
infrastructure which could then confront Helsinki with challenges
that it could not meet alone.
Therefore, Finland needed to find ways of associating with
other states to meet those nonmilitary challenges and, at the
same time, terminate its erstwhile political isolation by
participating in European integration. It chose the EU over the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) because the expansion
of NATO to its border would have alarmed Moscow and because
Helsinki viewed the threats to Europe as being essentially
nonmilitary, and thus outside NATO's mandate or purview. Also, as
Finland emerged from the Cold War, it found itself exposed to
severe economic dislocations, if not crises, that forced
integration upon both it and Sweden (whose international economic
lead Finland had to follow).
But, by opting for EU and European integration, Finland
stimulated fears at home that it was abandoning its reliance on
self-defense and chasing what might prove to be an elusive form
of indirect political guarantees in future crises. Other domestic
groups worried that Finland might be drawn into European crises
of others' making where it had no say in decisionmaking since it
was outside the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
As a result, the decision to join the EU forced a major domestic
debate which was won in 1994 by supporters of membership, and
which also led to publication of a White Paper on Finnish
security in 1995.
The Finnish Government published the 1995 White Paper to
educate Finnish elites and masses as to the purposes behind
Finland's policy and in order to give it a formal public
statement. The White Paper retains Finland's commitment to
independent defense. It also reflects Finland's support for a
strengthened EU/WEU capability for crisis management, peace
operations, and for dealing with the challenges posed by Russia's
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current crisis. The White Paper lists the threats that could
engage Finland due to Russia's crisis. These threats pertain
mainly to the possible breakdown of socio-political order in
Russia, the consequences of which would rapidly spread towards
Finland and the Baltic states while overwhelming those states'
ability to confront those challenges.
The White Paper both reaffirmed and carried forward the
policy perspectives that had developed in 1992-1994 as Finland
prepared for accession to the EU. It also reflected Finnish
policymakers' belief that EU membership opened the way to
overcome Finland's prior political isolation and even attain
indirect security guarantees. At the same time, Finland preserved
its independent defense capability.
But by 1995, when the White Paper came out, other Finnish
statements indicated a belief that the Western European Union
(WEU), the military arm, so to speak, of the EU, could become an
institution devoted to peace operations and crisis management and
that Finland could safely associate with the WEU for such
operations. The WEU, combined with NATO's Partnership for Peace
program that began in 1994, could become vehicles for Finland's
military integration with Europe and progress towards achieving
real, as opposed to indirect, security guarantees from Europe and
even, possibly, from the United States.
Finland has apparently come around to advocating this
position. It participates in the Partnership for Peace program
and accepts the EU/WEU as a security provider for instances where
peacemaking or peacekeeping forces are needed or for purely
political or economic issues. At the same time, Finland rejects
the idea that the WEU could be a parallel pillar or alternative
to NATO. As for self-defense, Finland remains as strongly
committed as before to providing its own robust self-defense
against threats to its integrity or sovereignty. One reason for
Helsinki's position is its belief that Finnish adhesion to the
WEU would again unnecessarily provoke Russia since Russia has
clearly indicated its apprehension about Finnish membership in
any European military alliance system.
However, Finland has crafted its evolving position with such
care that if its perspective on its role in European security
issues is accepted abroad, then Finland could come as close as
possible to NATO membership without formal membership in it.
Similarly Finland could come as close as possible to real
political, if not necessarily defense guarantees from either the
WEU or even NATO in the future. Its objectives are to maximize
Finnish room for maneuver and flexibility, while avoiding any
directly provocative actions against Moscow. Thus self-defense
remains the foundation of its position in Europe even as Helsinki
aspires to membership in the overall process of European
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integration.
Finland's subtle and evolving policy represents a
substantial departure from its previous, Cold War posture; this
is especially true in regard to NATO membership. Since avoiding
conflict and direct confrontation with Russia are Finland's top
priorities, and NATO expansion would spark such confrontation,
Finland must balance deterrence against Russia with reassurance
that it will not become a hostile base for anti-Russian
activities and the need to pursue European integration further
(to secure itself against nonmilitary threats and gain support if
such threats do emerge). For Finland, therefore, NATO expansion
should take place with maximum transparency, consultation, and
gradualness so that Finland does not become "a front-line state."
Similar goals apply to Finland's relationship with the
Baltic states. Finland's nuanced approach to Russia is not always
appreciated in those states whose emotional recollections of
Soviet/Russian oppression distort their policies. But, Finland is
working with them and other Nordic and Western states to relieve
sources of tension and subject them to international mediation
processes, and to bring the Baltic states into Europe in a
nonprovocative fashion that emulates Finland's own odyssey. Just
as Finland wants Russia integrated into as many European channels
as possible, so, too, does it want the Baltic states equally
enmeshed in those European networks as a means of preserving
regional peace in the Baltic. To the degree that Baltic security
issues are internationalized, peace remains secure, everyone is
consulted, and the Baltic states are not left face to face with
Russia.
Obviously not everyone will appreciate Finnish goals and
perspectives which contradict the vision of the WEU as a
"European pillar" that provides for Europe's defense as distinct
from NATO. Nonetheless, Finland's policy and vision combines
self-defense, a nonprovocative policy that sponsors Russia's
integration into Europe, and Finland's own integration with
Europe into a cohesive whole. For small states which must operate
in the shadow of a status quo set by others and where subregional organizations cannot provide defense against potential
threats, Finland might well become a model of how to proceed in
building individual, regional, and even European security.
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FINNISH SECURITY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY
Introduction.
In 1992 Finland applied to join the European Union (EU). It
formally entered the EU 3 years later. This decision to join the
EU reflected several fundamental changes in Finnish policy. By
applying to, and joining, the EU, Finland renounced the Cold War
policy of neutrality imposed by the 1948 Fenno-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) and embraced
integration with Europe. Membership in the EU also represents
Finland's newly-gained ability to think about its security in
broader terms than from 1944, when the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) defeated Finland and compelled it to leave World
War II, until 1991, when the Soviet Union fell apart. From 19441991, "defense" and "security" were almost synonymous in Finnish
thinking; policy focused almost solely upon not provoking Moscow.
Issues of economic security and economic integration with Europe
had relatively little significance for Helsinki compared to the
need to define a working relationship with Moscow and safeguard
Finnish independence. Once the Soviet Union collapsed and the
Cold War ended, Helsinki sought to defend Finnish independence by
joining Europe. Finnish goals were to obtain more freedom of
action, a broader sense of security, and political support from
the EU and, more generally, from the West.
Finland's strategic importance to Russia, Scandinavia, and
the Baltic littoral imparts considerable relevance to its
evolving outlook on European security; therefore, Helsinki's
thinking merits serious attention abroad. Thus, the evolution of
Finnish views from the time it applied to the EU (1992) to the
present has considerable significance for both regional security
in the Baltic and for European security more generally. The
decision to join the EU resulted from both a long internal debate
and the changed international situation at the end of the Cold
War. To grasp Finland's policies we must examine the decision to
join the EU, its internal debate and what Finland hopes to gain
from joining, its views on European integration and security
organizations (i.e., the Western European Union (WEU) and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), the future of
European security, and Finnish policy towards Russia and the
Baltic states.
The Decision to Enter the EU.
Finland's application to the EU owes much to its situation
at the end of the Cold War and to the fact that in 1991 Sweden
applied to the EU first.1 Before that, Finland was not part of
any bloc, and its formal ties to the Soviet-bloc Baltic littoral
states were quite limited. There were no formal political
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relations with the Baltic republics, which had yet to gain their
independence.
Instead, the 1947 Peace Treaty, the 1948 FCMA Treaty, and
Finland's proximity to the USSR determined the contours of its
policy. The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty set limits to the size of
Finland's armed forces (although it did not prohibit a large
reserve force) and excluded military equipment of an "offensive
nature."2 The FCMA treaty conceded Finland's right to selfdefense, but debarred it from joining any bloc and becoming a
base for foreign armed forces against the Soviet Union. Thus, the
FCMA treaty offered Moscow numerous opportunities to press
Finland to abandon neutrality and forced a highly circumspect
policy upon Helsinki. Finland had to choose neutrality of a
special sort that both blocs would accept.
Neutrality, a distinct and defining attribute of the Cold
War division of Europe, was an impediment to a truly independent
security policy for Finland. Helsinki had a very circumscribed
field of maneuver. Finnish neutrality precluded significant
regional defense cooperation with Sweden, other Scandinavian or
Baltic littoral states, the EU and NATO. Thus, Finland was
outside regional defense systems such as NATO, which guaranteed
Scandinavian states like Norway and Denmark against attack, and
which Sweden also believed provided an indirect guarantee of its
defense. Finland also acted with great caution towards the
emerging Baltic independence movements in the Soviet Union, only
beginning a very low-level cooperation with them in 1990.3
As the Cold War faded, neutrality became irrelevant when
there were no longer any hostile European blocs. As Soviet
pressure ebbed after the late 1980s, Finland also could act more
independently in foreign policy. Thus, in 1990 it unilaterally
renounced the terms of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty relating to
restrictions on its armed forces stemming from its cooperation
with Germany in World War II (Part III of the treaty) so that it
could act on its own to end all claims upon the reunified
Germany. The other sections of the treaty, dealing with postwar
border changes and reparations, were left intact, but Finland
nevertheless showed its growing interest and ability to obtain
more freedom of action abroad.4
As neutrality waned, other forces pushed Finland toward EU
integration. It became clear after 1991 that Eastern Europe
wanted a return to Europe, not neutrality, and that the only
available form of European integration seemed to be the EU. The
crises since 1991--Yugoslavia, the abortive Soviet coup of 1991,
Russia's long-term instability, and the general European economic
recession after 1992--all forced Finland to realize that its
previous policies had been superseded and were now risks to its
security.5
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The end of the Cold War opened a new era for Finland, but in
1992 it appeared to Helsinki as if Cold War polarity would be
replaced by division into center versus periphery or rich nations
versus poor. As Finland had been outside the Cold War blocs, it
now risked being consigned to Europe's periphery if it did not
move closer to the EU. At least publicly, Finland also had to
cede more importance to economic issues in its overall security
policy or risk becoming part of Europe's economic periphery.6
Nevertheless, it remained a captive of its location:
Traditional neutrality no longer has the same
significance as it had during the cold war--Finland's
foreign policy leadership wants our country to be
outside the European periphery both economically and
politically. The many elements of uncertainty in
Russia's development have also forced Finland to
participate more closely in European economic,
political, and military integration. Still, Finland's
future choice of policy will be determined not so much
by the fear of the negative effects of Russia's
unstable development as by a positive desire to forge
close links with the economically and militarily strong
central area of Europe. Our relationship with Russia
is, however, the most important single factor as far as
Finland is concerned, owing to its geographical
position.7
The recession of 1992-1995, partly caused by the 1992 crash
of European currencies due to the Bundesbank's deflationary
policies, also pushed an end to neutrality. It forced Finland to
reorganize its economic policy and commit itself more fully to
European integration and domestic restructuring. Due to earlier
mistaken economic policies, Finland, by 1994, was the hardest hit
of all European economies, making fundamental reforms necessary.8
Meanwhile, the end of the Soviet Union and the FCMA treaty regime
led to a new Russo-Finnish Treaty that stressed a common support
for market economies and, thus, greater equality vis-a-vis
Russia. Finnish analysts noted that normal economic actors in a
market relationship do not need an FCMA treaty that was an
instrument of subordination; rather, they meet as equals. They
claimed that Finland's existing market economy actually gives it
an advantage vis-a-vis Russia.9 Therefore, for all these reasons
(Finland's economic security, the need to overcome international
economic threats, the changed dimensions of the European security
agenda, and the changed environment for relations with Russia),
Finland deemed it necessary to approach the EU.
European integration through the EU entails some sacrifice
of autonomy in economic and (potentially) security policy since
the EU's Maastricht Treaty calls for integrated economic policies
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and currencies, as well as common foreign and security policies
(CFSP), but there are compensations. There are those who claim
that for Western European states, "membership in the European
Union--is in itself a major security guarantee and even a
sufficient security guarantee for almost any country."10 While
this claim is almost certainly exaggerated, EU membership surely
enhances political integration and indirect assurances of
political security by creating a climate where Finland is
regarded as a member of the club and is integrating into Europe.
In 1994, Alpo Rusi, a key advisor to President Martti
Ahtisaari, presented a public rationale for joining the EU. He
observed that because the EU is becoming the framework for
European integration, EU membership offers small states a chance
to influence European developments rather than being passive
objects of European trends.11 At the same time, only the EU can
help stabilize the neighboring Russian provinces of St.
Petersburg and Karelia and contribute thereby to Finnish and
Russian security.
The EU is the preferable organization to join because the
regional threats to Finnish stability are essentially nonmilitary in origin and nature.12 These threats relate to a
potential economic breakdown, ecological dangers, social
upheaval, crime, uncontrolled immigration, etc. Because NATO
relates primarily to issues of military defense, Rusi argued, its
expansion could destabilize Russian reform and is harmful, if not
irrelevant, to the real security challenges around Finland.13
Rusi supported preservation of the Northern European balance
because that status quo contributes to regional security.
Although NATO's posture guarantees the region, expanding NATO
could provoke Russia into more confrontational postures and
policies and deflect it from resolving its domestic problems--the
real threat to security. He also refuted NATO expansion by
claiming that Norway's membership in NATO (and the ensuing
guarantee to its defense) already indirectly strengthen Finnish
and Swedish security.14 Since applicants to the EU like Finland
are satisfied with the status quo, the EU's evolution into a
military power is therefore not to their interests, but quite the
contrary. Instead, Rusi claimed, the EU's expansion would offer
the Baltic and Scandinavian countries more leverage vis-a-vis
Russia.15
Finally, Rusi argued more broadly that the post-Cold War era
is usually typified by new threats that generally cannot be
deterred by military means. While deterrence is still needed
against armed attacks, the real threat is Europe's economicsocial cleavage into rich and poor. Cooperative solutions that
involve new institutions are also necessary, but they cannot
overcome that division of Europe. Only the EU can do that.
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Therefore, applicants need the EU not so much for military
security, but precisely for its stabilizing potential. The EU's
enlargement becomes the royal road to overcome fundamental socioeconomic challenges and stabilize European security.16
Rusi's ideas also became or reflected the official
consensus. After 1992 official rationales for joining the EU
moved from stressing economic security. Instead, they focused on
a vision of the EU as the center of a greater process of European
integration where Finnish security was more broadly conceived.17
Of course, policy does not emerge solely on the basis of a
logical analysis. Finland still faces a formidable neighbor.
Northern Europe's military division has not changed. Russia still
faces the West here. Indeed, the North is more crucial than ever
to Russia because its nuclear-fuelled ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN) fleet is essentially concentrated there and strategic arms
treaties appear to be forcing Russia to deploy ever greater
percentages of its strategic weapons at sea. Russian conventional
forces are also more concentrated in the Leningrad Military
District as a result of the evacuation of Central Europe.
Outside events can also affect policy. Sweden's 1991
application to the EU forced Helsinki's hand. To balance the
earlier forced military-political inclination to Moscow, Helsinki
had devised a cardinal policy principle that it could not afford
to remain outside any economic organization involving Sweden and
Finland's main customers, Germany and Great Britain. Otherwise
Swedish paper and metalworking industries would capture those
markets and marginalize Finnish exports (and presence) in Western
Europe. This principle led Finland to join free trade agreements
such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the
European Economic Community Organization (the EU's parent
organization) in Sweden's wake. Swedish neutrality was also the
western anchor that allowed Finland to preserve its neutrality
under Soviet pressure since it could argue that since Sweden,
too, was neutral, there was no regional threat to Moscow and,
therefore, no need for Finland to compromise its neutrality.
Thus, Sweden's 1991 application to the EU deprived Finland of
security options other than increased defense spending or
reorientation to either of Europe's two major blocs; this
underscored Finland's isolation from the Nordic community and its
key markets.18 Although major domestic lobbies benefitting from a
relatively privileged trading position with Moscow still hoped to
continue that relationship, Sweden forced Finland's hand before
it was ready.19 Luckily, the Soviet collapse allowed Finland to
apply to the EU, which it then did with alacrity in 1992.
Nevertheless, the decision to enter the EU has serious
consequences for Finland's overall security policy. It forces
Helsinki at some future point to rely for its security on the

5

EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the WEU, NATO, or
some other, as yet unseen, alternative. The EU, too, worried that
Finland's attachment to neutrality could put Finland and it at
odds, a concern that probably led Finland in 1993 to pledge its
support to work for a CFSP, as agreed at Maastricht.20
But, this decision led to domestic attacks on the government
for not having a security doctrine that spelled out how Finland
would evade the CFSP and keep a viable independent defense. One
critic observed,
It looks as though Finland's inverse strategy tends to
be the avoidance of making strategic decisions, not
participating in strategic decisions, not committing
ourselves to the solution of problems, being satisfied
with military "service-level" missions, but nonetheless
entertaining indirect hopes of aid from union countries
(WEU/NATO) if our own security fails us . . . . Thus
Finland is now joining the EU without a clear-cut
doctrine on its own security.21
This criticism also overlooked the fact that the decision to join
the EU indicated the government's desire to integrate with Europe
and its belief in the efficacy of doing so as a hedge against any
future threats that might ensue from Russia--not just an
invasion, but the potential collapse of Russia's civil
infrastructure, or action against the Baltic states.22 At no time
did the government contemplate giving up its doctrine of a
robust, independent defense. But these charges had to be answered
at home, making membership in the EU the subject of a national
referendum in 1994. Thus, the decision to join the EU, especially
as its rationale moved from economics to security, triggered a
grand debate over Finnish security policy, rival views of
European security, and Finland's place in Europe.
The Finnish Debate over the EU.
The Finnish debate over the EU was part of a greater debate
within European circles. One Continentalist school of thought
placed its faith in the evolution of the EU and the WEU as
Europe's primary security agent, while another Atlanticist school
emphasized NATO and the Transatlantic connection. While the
Continentalists argued on the basis of Europe's ever-deepening
security integration, the Atlanticists pointed to the reality of
NATO's function as a force for stability.23 Although sectoral or
economic concerns about the restructuring imposed by membership
in the EU--and dramatized by the concurrent economic crisis--were
expressed, apparently both groups' main concern in this debate
was for neutrality and independence.
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At home many analysts worried that by remaining an
uncommitted observer at the WEU, Finland would be isolated from
Europe and could be drawn into conflict situations with Russia.
Or, it might be dragged into EU conflicts of little concern to it
and where it had no control over the previous decisionmaking
process, e.g., Yugoslavia.24 Some feared that Finnish selfdefense capability and/or aloofness from distant European
conflicts could then be weakened without compensating gains.
The debates that now opened up the first open public
discussion of security policy since 194825 revolved around the
Continental or Atlantic defense options, those who believed that
Russia was a threat that must be confronted, those who argued
that Russia was a state that could be managed, and those who
wanted to keep all options open.26 Alternatively the debate could
be depicted as dividing those who claimed that neutrality had
been a "pragmatic" way to defend Finnish interests and those who
felt neutrality was a fundamental "principle" applicable to all
foreign policy questions other than actual self-defense. For the
pragmatists, the real challenge to the concept of neutrality was
Europe's unceasing economic integration, not the current security
situation. In a Europe where that integration led to a decline of
military factors' importance in policy, Finland could become part
of the interdependent whole only by finding a way other than
neutrality to defend its national interests.27 Opposing this
reasoning, "fundamentalists," like former Foreign Minister Paavo
Vayrynen, argued for universalizing the neutrality principle.
In foreign trade policy Finland has developed special
neutrality policy principles in the form of a balanced
integration with neighbouring areas as well as global
principles of universality and non-discrimination.
These principles also include the policy of nonparticipation in supra-national decision-making.28
That stand would, of course, have precluded joining the EU.
Three other factors complicated Finland's debate. One was
the fact that after Carl Bildt's Conservative Swedish Government
renounced neutrality in 1992-1994, going so far as to say it
would participate in defending the Baltic states against a
Russian invasion, the succeeding Swedish Socialist government in
1995 returned to an even stricter policy of military
nonintervention and neutrality. This nullified the effectiveness
of any NATO membership for Finland (since NATO's ability to help
Finland would be greatly limited by Sweden's neutrality) and it
restricted Swedish military planning, even though the Swedish
military has long sought more formal cooperation with Finland.29
The second factor is that until NATO decides who will join and
when it will admit new members, Finland cannot afford to apply
and be rejected. So, Finland was consigned to watchful waiting
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and reliance on the EU as Europe's situation clarifies.30 A third
factor, one that could never be fully stated in public yet is
understood by all, is that failure to join the EU could leave
Finland isolated and next to Russia. At present the whole object
of Finnish policy is to prevent that possibility without giving
Russia grounds for threats to Finland or its interests.
Therefore, "the prevailing strategy is to strengthen collective
actions which also improve the European institutional structure
and its ability to deal with the challenge of Russia without
adding confrontational elements to relations between Russia and
Europe."31 Under these conditions, it follows that membership in
the EU and an independent defense remain Finland's best options.
This debate presented Finnish leaders with novel challenges,
especially as the vital questions of Russia's orientation and the
security of the new Baltic states remained undecided in 1992.
But, the government's report to parliament then stressed that
military neutrality, i.e., Finland's exemption from foreign bases
and reliance on its own robust forces and command and control
would not be impugned by joining the EU.32 In 1992-1993, Defense
Minister Elisabeth Rehn and CINC Admiral Jan Klenberg first
defended the applications to the EU and for observer status in
the WEU because they preserved neutrality in foreign conflicts,
safeguarded Finland's independent defense capability, reassured
Moscow that its enemies were not approaching, and provided
political support against the possibility of being marginalized
or isolated in Europe.33 Nonetheless, the debate lasted through
1994 and the height of the economic crisis when the referendum
decided positively for membership.
Finland and the Future of European Security.
To meet the pressure for a public statement and to state
their goals, Finnish officials went public both individually and
in the form of the 1995 White Paper on Security Policy. The ideas
in the White Paper are not new; they match statements developed
in 1992-1994 by President Ahtisaari and the then-Esko Aho
government. Many of those policy statements were carried forward
when Paavo Lipponen's Social Democrats came to power in the 1995
elections. As early as 1993, Jaakko Blomberg, Undersecretary of
State for Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, forecasted
many points in the White Paper and outlined Finland's cautious
European policy.
Blomberg noted, first of all, that Finnish policy is shaped
within the triangle "Moscow-Berlin-Stockholm," and that Helsinki
now also had to add the Baltic states to the crucial and complex
framework of its security policy. Second, the new importance of
Russia's north--the heart of its naval strategic potential--had
made the area more important to both superpowers and to Finland
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by bringing the United States, in particular, closer to it. While
Cold War political rivalry had ended, mutually deterrent military
structures still prevailed in Northern Europe. Third, Finland
expected united Germany to play a much greater role in the
Baltic. Fourth, helping to stabilize Russia's transition was a
vital Finnish interest. Fifth, neutrality was not relevant in a
Europe increasingly committed to the common security project
inherent in the CSCE (after 1995 OSCE), the 1975 Helsinki Treaty,
and subsequent documents of the CSCE process.34
Therefore, Blomberg argued that Finland, by applying to the
EU, was not renouncing its independent defense and nonalignment.
Nor was it threatening Russia. As before, Finland would defend
against Russia, but not threaten it or actively join a hostile
anti-Russian bloc. But, by joining the EU, Finland would be
better able to support peaceful democratic change in Europe on
the basis of prosperity and common security. As an EU member,
Finland "would support the independence and security of the
Community and its members in a spirit of solidarity, and would
expect similar support in return for its own independence and
security."35 At the same time, by retaining its independent
defense, Finland neither renounced its own capacities nor
excluded future changes based on the 1996 Inter-Governmental
Conference (IGC) of the EU. Any such change would be a result of
the EU's unanimous decision.36 Though self-defense would remain
the basis of its policy, Finland could get greater and
unprecedented political support for itself through European
integration.
By 1995, Blomberg, however cautiously, was ready to go
further. Not only were Finnish defense interests compatible with
the EU's framework, it also was "not impossible that we could,
with such an agreement, obtain credible security guarantees
without a dangerous state of antagonism arising at the same time
on Finland's borders."37 If this outcome truly materialized, it
would give Finland more freedom of action and true security than
it ever had enjoyed--even if these guarantees were only indirect
and not commitments to mutual defense. Blomberg further contended
that the EU's evolution towards a CFSP under the Maastricht
framework was now occurring in an unexpected direction, i.e.,
within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. NATO now talked
about a distinct European security and defense identity (ESDI).
Functioning as its core, there is the entity made up of
the EU and WEU, which concentrates on developing
preparedness for peacekeeping and crisis management.
This requires increased military cooperation . . . . No
defence alliance is required for the union to develop
its security identity for crisis management.38
Blomberg clearly implied that by contributing its forces and
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experience in peace operations and crisis management to the WEU
and by participating in the PfP, Finland could achieve more
military-political integration with Europe in a nonthreatening
form that gave it hope for having more credible political
guarantees (if not binding alliance commitments) than before. It
is not for nothing that some Finnish officials call the PfP a
"genius program of military cooperation."39
Moreover, other Finnish officials supporting Blomberg stress
that Helsinki under an evolutionary EU/WEU still retains its
freedom of action and all its options. Indeed, it is now
possible, under Finnish law's stringent provisions on when forces
can be used abroad, to use Finnish troops (as in Bosnia) under an
OSCE or UN mandate.40 General Gustav Hagglund, Finland's
Commander-in-Chief and the former commander of United Nation (UN)
forces in Lebanon, has called for a crisis reaction brigade that
can be mobilized and deployed, including reservists, active
troops and NCOs, similar to Finland's UN forces. Those forces
could be used for peace operations abroad or for Finnish
defense.41 Thus, the EU/WEU's current evolution, especially
regarding peace operations, could offer Finland unprecedented
security advantages and eventually (potentially) real defense
guarantees.
The views of Blomberg and his supporters quickly became
those of the government as a whole. In May 1995, Premier Paavo
Lipponen suggested that the WEU become an organization devoted
primarily to peacekeeping and crisis management.42 In November
1995, he reiterated Finnish willingness to help plan such
operations, noting "It is unrealistic to replace NATO with
something European."43 Earlier, in October, the Cabinet had
proposed creating special standby forces within the military for
utilization abroad in international crisis management. Risto
Penttila, a member of Parliament and former researcher for the
Defense Ministry, gave the rationale for this policy, namely
that,
During a time of peace Finland should conduct a policy
that would take our country as close to NATO membership
as possible without Finland's formally joining the
alliance. This means that Finland's defense
organization is consistent with that of other EU and
NATO countries, and that Finland has a preparedness for
participating in the operations of a European mercenary
army with its own mercenary troops.44
It also is clear that the PfP provides an international
basis for doing so and facilitates Finnish military integration
with Europe. Indeed, by autumn 1995, the Finnish media were
proclaiming that Sweden and Finland were technically ready and
eligible for NATO membership; only the political decision needed
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to be made by both governments and NATO, they claimed.45
While NATO membership may be too precipitate a step for
Finland, it is clear that Finnish views about membership in the
EU and the WEU's mission contradict the idea that the WEU can and
should supplant NATO. Therefore Finland had to clarify its views
on Europe's evolving security structures. This is another reason
why the government issued a White Paper on Finland and European
security.
The White Paper.
The White Paper explicitly tries to define Finnish interests
and perceptions in a still violent world where, nevertheless, a
common security order is emerging in Europe on the basis of
democracy and human rights.46 Even so, the White Paper places a
much greater stress on local security issues, such as Russia and
the Baltic, rather than on general European themes. Clearly local
concerns shape Helsinki's broader security vistas.
The White Paper forthrightly defends Finland's military
policy of nonalliance and independent defense. Finnish military
capability must ensure that Finland does not become the target of
military speculation, let alone military force. The aim is to
make use of force a nonoption even in crises smaller than war.47
Europe's changing military situation has,
. . . not prompted any need to alter Finland's defence
solution which relies on territorial defence of the
whole country and a large reservist army based on
universal military service, an arrangement dictated by
the country's large size, small population, and limited
resources.48
This point politely reminds Europe and the Finnish public
that although the OSCE project endorses the indivisibility of
European security, it has failed in Yugoslavia and vis-a-vis
Russia. While the OSCE is acknowledged to be a norm-setting
institution for Europe, the White Paper notes that security
organizations have a practical significance based on their past
record and the expectations attached to them. Ultimately their
influence depends on states' political will to use them to solve
security problems. Yugoslavia has tested all the European
security institutions' credibility and found them wanting.49 As
General Owe Wiktorin, Chief of Sweden's General Staff, said,
Yugoslavia taught small states (like Finland) that,
As a result of Bosnia and other armed conflicts we have
come to accept war on European territory. The message
is, in particular for a small nation, that if you do
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not take care of your security no one else may care.50
Despite guarantees to the contrary, small European states in
Central and Eastern Europe have to defend themselves because they
are alone. European security, despite contrary claims, is, or has
been until now, divisible. Multilateralism or collective security
here are indeed of little value. The repercussions of this
divisibility of European security are immense. In the White Paper
and recent statements on continuing Finland's robust independent
defense posture, one finds an undercurrent of unease about the
failure of EU/WEU to move on security issues and on the
divisibility of European security.
What then are the implications for Finland of the EU's
failures? They are the need to find broader venues of political
support abroad while preserving its independent defense
capability. As the White Paper repeatedly indicates, Finland
promotes Nordic collaboration.51 It also insists that its defense
posture and status in the EU contribute to its ability to foster
cooperative security in Europe.52 Nevertheless, the White Paper
spells out the concept or vision for the EU/WEU that Blomberg and
other officials outlined in earlier statements or articles.
The primary task of the Union's defence dimension in
the short term is to develop a capability for crisis
management. The means to this are the strengthening of
the WEU's operational and structural capabilities and
cooperation between the WEU and NATO within the
Combined Joint Task Forces model. Further building of
the institutional relations between the EU and WEU in
the light of the crisis management role can be
discussed at the intergovernmental conference of the EU
in 1996.53
While Finland will defend itself against attack or threats,
the WEU should limit itself to crisis management and peace
operations. Although President Ahtisaari does not see such EU/WEU
integration as discussed by Blomberg as occurring anytime soon,
he does favor these organizations' closer cooperation on the
basis of their current evolution.54 At the same time, he noted
that the development of a rapid reaction force for use in Bosnia
or other similar contingencies also strengthens Finland's own
defense capability.55 In fact, Paavo Lipponen observed that if
the WEU decided to confine itself to peacekeeping and crisis
management, Finland might change its attitude and join it. But
that would mean the WEU renounced all hope of becoming a separate
European pillar that somehow substituted for NATO or replaced it
when Washington would not act.56 The WEU then would only be the
European pillar of NATO, which would remain the only indisputably
effective military organization for European security.57
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Finland must therefore confront the question of what happens
if the WEU and/or the EU fails to develop as intended. Or to put
it differently, Helsinki must confront the lessons Wiktorin draws
from Yugoslavia. For President Ahtisaari, the ideal of common or
cooperative security for Finland is based on first, economic and
political integration and bilateral ties among states, then
preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and crisis management through
the OSCE, North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), PfP, WEU,
and NATO, and finally Finland's reliance upon its independent
military capability. That structure will be undone if the EU/WEU
continues to fail to evolve a credible defense policy.58 Up to
now the EU option supposedly gave Finland the maximum available
indirect security guarantees of a collective European response to
threats to it, consonant with Russian willingness to accept
Finland's integration into Europe.59 But if the EU fails to
develop along such lines, Finland will then have no credible
option other than self-defense when confronted by Russia.
One must agree with defense analyst Tomas Ries concerning
the stakes of the game for Helsinki. Ries notes that by joining
the EU Finland has slammed the door on its past policies whose
priority was, above all, good relations with Russia. While
membership in the EU is intended to help Finland cope with
challenges stemming from Russia, it also indicates that Finland
will now first exercise its European option in dealing with
Russia, and not face Russia alone, as before. Since Russia today
is evidently in an anti-Western phase,
Finland has very heavy stakes in the security-political
vigor of the organization she is joining. In this
respect Finland is--more than any other Nordic
applicant--strongly dependent on the political as well
as economic success of the European Union. For without
a politically strong European Union Finland risks being
stranded in a very dangerous situation. From this
perspective Finland should be one of the strongest
proponents of the continued political deepening [of the
EU]--including in the area of the CFSP of the EU.60
Finland and NATO.
Finland's relationship to NATO becomes a difficult political
issue that must be faced. Finnish thinking about the WEU and NATO
offers both a possible answer to Ries' analysis of potential
threats to Finland if the EU fails to evolve as hoped and a
chance to develop military-political collaboration, and even
integration, with all other European agencies, including NATO,
through the PfP.61 At the same time, apart from its highly
negative impact on Russia, a NATO guarantee to Finland would be
extremely difficult to realize in view of Swedish neutrality.62
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While Finland accepts that preserving NATO's ability to defend
its core members is a basic prerequisite for Northern European
and continental security, Finland must be able to count on solid
guarantees and to defend its own interests.63
The question of Finnish membership in NATO or security
guarantee is directly related to Finland's geographical location.
As General Gustav Hagglund observed, Finnish membership in the EU
makes Finland's border with Russia the EU's border. Any tension
between the EU and Russia could bring that border into focus.
Avoiding such political conflict is Finland's "top priority."
While Russia welcomed Finland's membership in the EU, Hagglund
rightly noted that Russia has said that Finnish membership in
NATO "would force Russia to reassess its policy and increase its
military forces in those areas bordering on Finland."64 Hagglund
argues that Finnish defense policy currently produces a robust
independent defense; therefore, Finland does not now need a NATO
membership or guarantee. What it does need is a well-oiled
mechanism for dealing with local crises and, therefore, the
enhancement of a reliable European crisis management and peace
operations agency. He expressed concern about U.S. willingness to
intervene in purely domestic European conflicts and about NATO's
expansion producing a new division of Europe. Instead, he
strongly favored continuing the PfP which could increase security
without isolating Russia. Custom-made and clearly defined
security guarantees could be added to PfP without estranging
Russia or diminishing the security of any PfP member who might
experience threats. Indeed, Finland's defense model merits
emulation by Central and East Europe under the PfP, while
simultaneously expanding the EU would not increase instability in
Europe. Expanding NATO would be provocative and actually lessen
Finland's ability to deal with future local crises.65
In a series of 1995 statements, Lipponen further refined
this stance towards NATO. Replying to Russia's public concerns
about Finnish membership in NATO, he noted that Finland had many
options, and that the existing balance in its relations with
Moscow and Europe is a function of its membership in the EU (a
fundamental reversal of the whole 1948-1991 policy of thinking
about Russia first that surprisingly evoked little response at
home or abroad). Moreover, Finland does not now need NATO
membership thanks to this balance in its foreign relations. Thus,
Finland's options depend on Russian developments. In other words,
the onus is on Russia, not Finland, to maintain security.66
Discussions of Finland's NATO membership are, perhaps, misguided.
Former Foreign Minister Heikki Haavisto correctly noted as far
back as 1993 that NATO has renounced taking in new members
anytime soon.67 Three years later, NATO has not yet found
expansion to be an urgent necessity, confirming Finland's refusal
until now to apply for that membership. Indeed, one gets the
impression the government would like the issue of Finland and
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NATO to go away from the headlines. Lipponen even denounced talk
of NATO membership as idle chatter.68 But even so, it is clear
that Finland retains its option to join NATO if things change.
Meanwhile, officials are more concerned than they will admit
that Sweden went back to neutrality and that the EU has failed to
date in security. As Lipponen observed, "The EU is forced to bear
the responsibility, but despite this it cannot influence anything
through its current crisis intervention and decisionmaking
system."69 This situation leaves Finland with few options other
than self-defense and NATO's current prolonged and cautious
expansion based on thorough discussions with Moscow and "no
vetoes and no surprises." Otherwise, fears that NATO expansion
will provoke Russia and lessen Finland's ability to deal with
local crises will materialize, and Finland will once again be
alone face-to-face with an irate Russia.
Similar attitudes emerged during interviews with Finnish
officials. They noted the continuing division in NATO over its
expansion and also stressed that an effective defense capability
is more important than collective foreign defense guarantees.
This capability makes it difficult for Russia, under the best of
circumstances, to attack Finland; Russia today is far from having
the interest, need, resources, or will to do so. Therefore, if
NATO does expand, Finland would be best served by a process
having maximum transparency, i.e., "no surprises nor vetoes," and
thus no division of Europe into spheres of influence, e.g., those
in and those out of NATO and thus in Russia's sphere. Rapid NATO
expansion, particularly into the Baltic states, constitutes a
highly provocative act that could actually turn the Baltic into a
grey zone and tempt Russia back into it as many Russian planner
would seem to want.70 For the same reason of preventing
provocative acts or the capability for conducting them, Finland
opposed revising the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
to allow Russia more forces in the Leningrad Military District.
Therefore, in Helsinki's view, the expanding contacts through the
PfP and using the WEU for peace operations and crisis management,
not new functions, best serve both the WEU and Finnish
interests.71
Foreign observers also agree that Finland has a paramount
interest in NATO remaining an efficient, credible, and effective
defense system. Ideally for Helsinki this means that if NATO is
to expand and Finland to join it, NATO should do so over time to
assuage Russian fears and prevent threats to Finland in response
to its entry into NATO. The attainment of this situation in
Europe would mean that NATO and Europe had moved decisively in
the direction of a true collective security system on a panEuropean scale based on structures of confidence with Russia and
other nonmembers. Or, in other words, Finland can safely join
NATO when Russia is fully integrated into a European security
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system. As Hansrudolf Kramer noted, "If NATO develops into a
genuine system of collective security, Russia will have to
participate in it in some form or other. In that case, Finland
could participate in it as well."72 Since NATO expansion will
take a long time but Russia's reaction will be swift, and it is
unclear who will be admitted or whether all 16 NATO members will
favor Finland or anyone else in the foreseeable future, Finland's
security option and strategy, however flawed, remains that
outlined in 1992 in a speech in Finland by Norway's then Foreign
Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg. He stated then that,
Closer cooperation means that the region will be more
easily affected by developments in Russia, even if
political events should take an unexpected turn. The
best way for us to deal with such a situation is to
ensure that the Nordic countries are firmly linked with
broader-based European arrangements so that any
pressure on the area is also regarded as a pressure on
our partners in cooperation.73
Even though Sweden has more than reversed its course towards
security integration with Europe and Norway's voters rejected EU
membership, those facts do not invalidate Stoltenberg's insights.
Rather, Finland must redouble it efforts to stabilize Russia and
the Baltic through its membership in the EU and integration with
Europe because that is the only way it can avoid isolation next
to Russia and/or peripheralization in Europe.
Finland and Russia.
The growing size of Russia's forces in the Northwest and
Leningrad Military Districts (which has led Finland to oppose
Russian efforts to revise the CFE Treaty's local provisions)74
and the condition of the former Finnish province of Karelia on
the Russian border remain serious international issues smoldering
between Finland and Russia;75 nevertheless, the quandaries posed
by Russia's uncertain domestic evolution remain Finland's single
greatest concern. These potential dangers include a breakdown of
civil order inside Russia, major Russian threats to the Baltic
states, or the possibility that a Russian reaction to a rash NATO
expansion would place Helsinki in an isolated, but
confrontational, posture vis-a-vis Moscow. While nobody
imminently expects overt military threats against Finland as in
1939, or even the kinds of pressure exercised intermittently
after 1944, the Russo-Finnish border and the Russian North have
become more critical for Moscow, and troop strength there has
been built up since 1991.76
Many other negative alternatives, however, are possible.
Tomas Ries has identified three broad categories of such
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nonmilitary alternatives, so-called "soft" crises, that would
require substantial mutual political will to resolve over the
long term lest they spawn bigger, more violent crises. The first
set of problems, caused by the poverty gap between Russia
(especially in its Northwest Provinces) and the EU with Finland,
threaten the collapse of Russia's social infrastructure, either
regionally or in general. Such a breakdown could trigger still
greater criminal trans-border pathologies, massive ecological
destruction, large-scale unregulated immigration, and a breakdown
of Russian public health, which, in tandem with Russia's
tremendous pollution problems, could trigger epidemics,
pandemics, and general public panics.77 While all the
Scandinavian states are cooperating with Russia in projects to
manage pollution, those projects are underfunded. The
disorganized situation in Russia, and the unstable political
order there have limited economic progress. A collapse of
Russia's infrastructure could also assume the form of a new
Chernobyl or major industrial accidents, e.g., when over 800
people sank on a ferry in the Gulf of Finland in 1994. The
incidence of both petty and organized crime also is rising. The
latter in particular poses difficult trans-border security
problems, especially in view of the penetration of Russia's
government by criminal elements. Any further erosion of Russia's
social infrastructure that could bring about epidemics and
unregulated large-scale immigration would certainly strain
Finland's infrastructure and police forces. As Ries observes,
The main point to note being that the scale and
intensity of all these problems would almost certainly
increase as a function of greater economic hardship in
Russia and/or further breakup of state structures. This
would be complicated by the fact that various forms of
crisis could begin interacting, generating new
problems. Finally the situation would deteriorate
further as the breakdown of organized life in Russia
made it more difficult for the Nordic authorities to
find counterparts with which to cooperate.78
A second category of threats that could challenge Finnish
security is the breakdown of Russia's political infrastructure,
either on its own, or in tandem with these kinds of crises. As
Chechnya shows, the potential for violence inside the Russian
Federation remains high and recent events underscore that nuclear
controls are not fully guaranteed.79 Many different scenarios,
like the October 1993 clash between Russian President Boris
Yeltsin and his Parliamentary opponents, or the exacerbation of
Chechnya or other ethno-political conflicts are all possible.
While Russia's Northwest appears relatively calm, St. Petersburg
obviously would be a glittering prize in the event of major
conflict, and instability there instantly alerts Finnish
policymakers.

17

However, the more likely threat is the further development
of a hardening Russian policy based either on the military and
defense industrial sectors or championing a fundamentally
militarized view of European and Russian security.80 That trend
could easily harden into a lasting division of Russia and Europe,
making Finland a "front-line state," exactly the opposite of
Finnish goals. Perhaps the most dangerous manifestation of such
trends would be the possibility of concerted Russian pressure,
not just military but also economic, against the Baltic States,
or worse yet a new attempt to annex them or curtail their
sovereignty.
For these reasons Finland wants Russia integrated into
Europe through as many channels as possible. Finland, as an
experienced middleman in Russian trade and gateway to Russia,
could benefit quite handsomely from expanded EU-Russian economic
relations. President Ahtisaari recently attacked NATO expansion,
and instead urged enlarging the EU, initiating a U.S.-Russian-EU
"permanent political dialogue," and integrating Russia into the
multilateral trading system from which it has been excluded, an
exclusion that also greatly irks Russia.81 Another instance where
Finland participates in a multilateral initiative to draw Russia
closer to Europe is the Barents Sea Initiative, the result of a
1992 Norwegian proposal. As Norway's late Defense Minister Johann
Jorgen Holst observed before his untimely death in 1993, the
Nordic states' main function, revealed in this initiative, is to
create regional bases for stability in the North which will then
influence broader European developments.82 And indeed, some
observers of this initiative openly aspire that the cooperation
generated here can provide the impetus for a "security community"
starting in Europe's high north and spreading outward from
there.83
Finally, when on January 25, 1996, the Council of Europe
voted to accept Russia as a member, President Ahtisaari and many
Finnish Parliamentarians strongly supported this decision on the
grounds that including Russia in organizations of multilateral
European cooperation would be of the utmost importance for
European stability. Not surprisingly, this stance annoyed
Estonia's delegation, a sign of the diverging attitudes of
Finland and its Baltic friends towards Russia.84
Finland and the Baltic States.
Finland views the tension between Russia and the Baltic
states as among the most critical of possible threats to its
security. It works steadily, particularly with Estonia where it
has special cultural ties, to stabilize the whole area. Finland
pursues three main lines of policy that aim to prevent the area
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from becoming a source of tension in Europe. It uses economic,
political, and low-level military cooperation to strengthen the
new states' independence, promote their good relationship with
Russia, and facilitate their integration with Europe through the
EU.85 It has worked to soften discord over borders and economic
issues, preferring to see the problems of Russian minorities and
soldiers stationed there resolved in an all-European context by
international and OSCE mediation.86
Finland would like for Baltic issues to be
internationalized, i.e., discussed in the widest possible
multilateral setting, preferably including the OSCE and the EU.
This would ensure transparency, reassure all parties that they
are not alone and that they can get a fair hearing, and habituate
them to purely political processes of conflict resolution,
preventive diplomacy, fact-finding, and verification. The Baltic
states, unlike Finland from 1944-1991, would then not have to
face Moscow on their own, and grievances, real or imagined, would
be dealt with openly and fairly.87 Similarly, for the long term,
Finland strongly urges that the Baltic states join the EU and be
considered for membership on an equal basis with other Central
European applicants as confirmed by the EU's Essen summit in
1994.
Nonetheless, the high level of animosity towards Russia and
Russians, particularly in Latvia and Estonia, makes Finland's
role of advising reconciliation very difficult, and Finnish
officials hint at their and Europe's impatience with these Baltic
policies.88 This attitude naturally complicates Finland's
advocacy role for the Baltic states in the EU, the Council of
Europe, and other international agencies, where Baltic policies
have aroused criticism. Nor does the visible decline in
cooperation among the Baltic states aid Finland's efforts.89
Certainly this impedes Finnish and other Scandinavian efforts to
foster Baltic military cooperation and train officers there.
Essentially Finland would like to see the Baltic states
profit from its example whereby Finlandization, a policy of
carefully regulated "liturgical" friendship with Russia, provided
a way to ensure the national defense by other means, e.g.,
avoiding deliberately provocative stances towards Russia.90 This
posture finds expression in the White Paper which openly calls
for Nordic countries to help the Baltic states normalize
relations with Russia to facilitate their integration with Europe
and stabilize the whole region.91 Finland would also like Estonia
and Latvia to arrange for the status of their largely stateless
Russian population on a legislative basis conforming to the
standards of the OSCE, Council of Europe, and international
law.92 Finland has abetted this project in the past and stands
ready to continue doing so.
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Helsinki tries to focus the EU's political interest and
resources on supporting the Baltic states' integration with the
EU, and Europe in general, to develop the entire Baltic region,
including Russia. Finland considers such activity a key element
in its regional security policy and a justification of its
decision to join the EU.93 To the degree that the Baltic states
are truly in Europe, it then becomes harder for Russia to
pressure them. The Baltic states will then feel more secure about
their ability to defend their interests in a nonprovocative way
because their EU membership will provide a form of economicpolitical deterrence and reassurance to Moscow and the Baltic
capitals by helping to restrain everyone's moves.
Indeed, the most recent Finnish policy trend apparently now
accepts that the Nordic states alone cannot guarantee the Baltic
states' security. Therefore, if and when NATO expands, those
states must not be left outside of the European security
structure.94 While this is not an endorsement of either NATO
expansion or those states' inclusion in NATO, it does seem to
represent a step forward from preexisting policy guidelines that
invoked the need for the Baltic states to be integrated into
Europe to admit that such integration also serves Finland's
interests and to reject the apparent call by Russia's ambassador
to Finland, Yuri Deriabin, that the Baltic states follow Sweden
and Finland's neutrality.95
Finland and Europe: Some Concluding Observations.
Finnish interest in the EU stands revealed as part of an
evolving strategy to maximize its freedom of action and secure a
real guarantee of security--self-defense--while contributing to
and facilitating the long-term transformation of the broader
European security system that could ultimately provide it with
credible external guarantees. However, from today's vantage
point, Finland's hopes for the EU/WEU can only be realized if
these organizations clarify their real position on expansion
eastward and form a meaningful defense arm in the WEU devoted to
peacekeeping and crisis management. Finland could then
participate in PfP and/or OSCE activities in regions such as
Bosnia, and thereby strengthen its military-political integration
with the West. Since key EU members still show little practical
inclination to reform the EU and overcome the obstacles to its
economic-political expansion, and since the WEU remains unable to
take advantage of U.S. support for European integration to create
meaningful European military structures, Finland's insistence on
a "lone wolf" defense policy appears eminently realistic.96 But
it comes at a price, especially if NATO expands and Russia reacts
truculently.
Finland is not without a military option. It could consider
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a military alliance if threats arose because Europe's current
security system is an interdependent one, i.e., nobody can act
threateningly without affecting the whole system. Finland then
would not be alone in making such a choice if new threats
appeared. But, since Europe is, in fact, not actively considering
implementing a common defense policy (as the language of
Maastricht, the reality of the situation, and the dispensation
given to Denmark not to join the CFSP all indicate), "progress in
defence matters will occur in the form of crisis management, not
in common defence."97 This is still Finnish policy. And Finland's
recommendations for the WEU appear more realistic for it than the
WEU's previous efforts at rivalling NATO.
Nonetheless, partisans of the WEU as a separate European
defense institution are not happy to acknowledge this reality
unless France's rejoining of NATO's military system terminates
the paralyzing debate over these institutions. This debate has
obvious relevance for Finland since it has staked so much on
demarcating the WEU from NATO. The WEU as NATO's rival cannot be
justified merely as a matter of European states' dignity,
especially since Finland or other small states near Russia need
real guarantees if they renounce self-defense.98 However,
partisans of the WEU becoming a true European pillar naturally
resent the attitude of the neutrals (or former neutrals), whom
they regard as "free riders" on the EU/WEU, that demand
commitments from Brussels and relevant capitals while they shirk
making the same commitment to the EU and WEU.99 NATO SecretaryGeneral Javier Solana, writing while still Spain's Foreign
Minister, complained that some neutral EU members could prevent
the WEU from implementing the EU's decisions with defense
implications. He also questioned the notion that EU membership
provided some sort of implicit security guarantee for states
which are unable to accede to membership in WEU or NATO.100
Such complaints, however, overlook Finland's dilemma,
especially in view of Sweden's retreat on regional and European
military-political integration. If Finland is to have real
security, it must simultaneously embrace self-defense and
economic-political integration, even if the seeming paradox
overshadows attempts at logical analysis.101 As a recent analysis
of European security issues observes,
The inherent diffusion of political power in European
institutions simply denies the smaller countries an
effective, unified role in the restructuring process.
This realization spawns efforts by smaller states to
strengthen smaller sub-regional organizations, but this
will not ensure security structure emerging to fill the
gap left by the dissolution of the WTO [Warsaw Treaty
Organization]. None of the forums in Central Europe has
been used to initiate local ideas on security
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management.102
What then is left for Finland except self-defense and
membership in the EU? This is particularly the case in Northern
Europe given Norway's failure to join EU, Sweden's retreat from
its policies of 1992-1994, and the unresolved Baltic and Russian
situations. A robust, independent self-defense is Helsinki's only
credible card.
In the final analysis Helsinki long ago learned Wiktorin's
lesson ("if you do not take care of your security no one else may
care"103)at profound cost. In small states, NATO membership is not
a substitute for a rational security policy. If Europe and the
West cannot meet today's challenges, Finland will be isolated and
on the front line, obliged to meet them on its own. But if the EU
and NATO can resolve those challenges and move towards a genuine
pan-European system, Finland is admirably placed to move with
them. Finland's recent policies have overcome the solitude
imposed upon it from 1944-1991. Henceforth, Finland could likely
have more real chances for security cooperation than ever before.
While there are still some who cannot appreciate the magnitude of
Finland's concerns or its achievements, European security
policies that neglect Finnish thinking and experience injure not
only Finland, but also Europe.
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